




















Study on Remittances and Household Finances in the Philippines and Tajikistan  
 
Resilience against the Pandemic: the Impact of COVID-19 on 
Migration and Household Welfare in Tajikistan 










January  2021 
 
 
JICA Ogata Sadako 
Research Institute 
for Peace and Development 
  

















     
Use and dissemination of this working paper is encouraged; however, the JICA Ogata 
Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development requests due acknowledgement 
and a copy of any publication for which this working paper has provided input. The views 
expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the 
official positions of either the JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and 
Development or JICA. 
 
 
JICA Ogata Sadako Research Institute for Peace and Development 
10-5 Ichigaya Honmura-cho 
Shinjuku-ku 





Resilience against the Pandemic:  
the Impact of COVID-19 on Migration and Household Welfare in Tajikistan 
 





Tajikistan’s economy hinges heavily on remittance inflows mainly from Russia that have 
exceeded a quarter of annual GDP in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have 
adverse effects on the economy through damage to migration and remittances. We use a unique 
monthly household panel dataset that covers the period both before and after the outbreak to 
examine the impacts of COVID-19 on a variety of household welfare outcomes. We provide 
several brand-new findings. First, the adverse effects of the pandemic were particularly 
pronounced in April and May in 2020 but gradually diminished afterward, with some indicators 
leveling out in autumn. Second, in contrast to expectation, the pandemic had a sharp but only 
transitory effect on the stock of migrants working abroad in the spring. Some expected migrants 
were forced to remain in their home country during the border closures, while some of the 
incumbent migrants expecting to return were not able to do so, and remained employed in their 
destination countries. Both departures and returns started to increase again from summer. 
Employment and remittances of the migrants quickly recovered to levels seen in previous years, 
after a sharp decline in April and May. Third, regression analyses reveal that both migration and 
remittances have helped to mitigate the negative economic outcomes at home during the 
“with-COVID-19” period, suggesting that they served as a form of insurance. Overall, the 
unfavorable effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were severe and temporary right after the 
outbreak, but households with migrants were more resilient against the pandemic. 
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This study provides brand-new evidence on the impact of the Coronavirus disease 19 
(COVID-19) pandemic on migration and household welfare in Tajikistan by using a unique 
high-frequency household panel dataset that covers the period both before and after the outbreak. 
By doing so, we aim to inform academics and policymakers on how the pandemic has affected 
households in a remittance-dependent country.  
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected households all over the world in various ways. 
Adverse effects such as limited mobility and economic recession are not confined within 
national borders but are likely to spill over to other countries. If we limit our scope to 
developing countries, a major channel of international transmission of the pandemic is relevant 
to remittance inflows, since remittances sent by international migrants are now the largest 
source of external financing for developing countries, exceeding the amount of official 
development assistance (ODA) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (World Bank 2020a). The 
pandemic is potentially devastating to those countries because of economic downturns in 
destination countries, now under lockdown and suffering from oil price crashes, restrictions on 
remittances under stringent movement bans, and the cancelation of planned migration (IOM 
2020). Indeed, remittance inflows to developing countries started to decline after the outbreak in 
several countries (Kikkawa et al. 2020). In April, the World Bank released a pessimistic estimate 
that remittances to low- and middle-income countries are projected to fall by 19.7% on average, 
with the largest at 27.5% in Europe and Central Asia by region (World Bank 2020b).1  
In this study, we examine the case of Tajikistan. Tajikistan is one of the most 
remittance-dependent countries in the world in terms of remittance inflows relative to GDP, 
which were estimated to be 28.2% in 2019, making it the fifth-ranked country in the world. The 
country has expanded international migration and remittance inflows over the two decades since 






the end of the civil war in 1998. Remittance inflows relative to GDP reached more than 40% in 
2007 and have remained at a high level of more or less 30% to date, with a temporary decline 
occurring during the 2008 global financial crisis. They also declined under a series of 
exogenous adverse events in the mid-2010s, such as the economic downturn and tighter 
migration policy in Russia. In Tajikistan, more than 40% of households have at least one 
international migrant, and most migrants from Tajikistan are working-age young men residing in 
rural areas without a job before leaving the country (JICA Ogata Research Institute 2020; 
Shimizutani and Yamada 2020). Given the high prevalence of migration, a substantial decline in 
remittance inflows may be devastating to household welfare in Tajikistan if the COVID-19 
pandemic has indeed caused damage to international migration and remittances.  
The first case of the COVID-19 in Tajikistan was officially declared on April 30, much 
later than in other countries. In contrast to neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
was reluctant to take strong measures to prevent the pandemic, imposing less strict restrictions 
on movement across international borders and lockdowns in cities. Tajikistan started to close its 
borders to neighboring countries in March, but schools resumed on April 1 after the spring 
holidays. In April, the government held a meeting on the pandemic and announced temporary 
restrictions on the entry and exit of all foreign citizens through all checkpoints at state borders. 
It was not until April 23 that Tajikistan started to take preventive measures to close schools, 
while professional sporting matches were held until the end of April.2  
Even after the first case was confirmed at the end of April, Tajikistan did not impose a 
total lockdown but instead pursued a more relaxed approach. In May, a ban on mass events was 
introduced and all people were required to wear face masks outside their houses. The number of 
new confirmed cases grew, reaching 100 persons per day on May 14 and exceeding 200 persons 
per day from May 15 to 22 (Figure 1). The number of new confirmed cases declined to less than 
100 persons per day from June and has remained lower than 50 persons per day to date with 
                                            





some fluctuations. At the end of November 2020, the cumulative number of confirmed cases is 
close to 12,000 and the number of deaths is 86, which is much smaller than other Central Asian 
countries.3 Given these numbers, which are considered to have been underestimated,4 the 
adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic seem to have been less serious in Tajikistan, and the 
country has largely succeeded in containing the pandemic compared with other countries.  
However, this is not the end of the COVID-19 pandemic story in Tajikistan, since the 
main destination country of migrants is seriously affected. Tajik international migrants are 
highly concentrated in Russia because Tajikistan maintained close economic ties with Russia as 
a former Soviet Republic in Central Asia (JICA-RI 2020). In 2018, more than 90% of the Tajik 
migrants headed to Russia to work as marginal laborers in the construction and service sectors 
(Shimizutani and Yamada 2020),5 suggesting that Tajik labor migrants are low-skilled workers 
vulnerable to changes in the Russian economy and migration policy. Indeed, remittance inflows 
to Tajikistan declined in the mid-2010s, because of a series of adverse events in Russia, such as 
stricter immigration policies effective in 2015, the oil price crash and economic recession after 
the 2014 Olympic Games, the annexation of Crimea, and large fluctuations in the exchange rate 
with the Russian ruble.  
In Russia, the first case of the COVID-19 was confirmed on January 31, three months 
before Tajikistan. The number of confirmed cases started to increase beginning in March and the 
first death was reported in mid-March. The country closed its international borders to foreigners 
on March 18 and declared a period of no work to urge people to stay home until May 11, which 
was extended two times.6 In contrast to Tajikistan, the Russian government has imposed a 
                                            
3 As of November 29, 2020, the cumulative number of confirmed cases (deaths) is 12,155 (86) in 
Tajikistan, 131,659 (1,990) in Kazakhstan, 72,870 (608) in Uzbekistan and 72,807 (1,271) in Kyrgyzstan. 
4 For example, Catherine Putz “Are There Really No COVID-19 Cases in Tajikistan?” The Diplomat 
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/are-there-really-no-covid-19-cases-in-tajikistan. 
5 The jobs in the destination countries are often irrelevant to migrants’ educational or professional 
backgrounds, and young people expecting to migrate are reluctant to take on professional education and 
choose instead to work at unskilled jobs in Russia. Such positions offer the opportunity to earn much 
more than they would as skilled workers in Tajikistan. This phenomenon is called the “forsaken schooling 
trap” (Abdulloev, Epstein, and Gang 2019; Abdulloev 2020). 
6 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty “Tajik Workers Face Dire Future As Russia Closes Borders Over 
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variety of strict measures such as closing public institutions and canceling events, as well as 
instituting lockdowns in many large cities. Under these circumstances, newspapers reported that 
many migrants expecting to depart for or return from their destination countries had been forced 
to stay.7 Meanwhile, the number of new confirmed cases per day expanded rapidly to exceed 
10,000 in the first half of May, with a gradually declining trend towards the end of August. 
However, following this, the number of confirmed cases started to grow much more quickly 
again, exceeding 10,000 per day at the beginning of October, and 20,000 in November. The 
cumulative number of confirmed cases reached one million on September 2, two million on 
November 20, and was 2,249,890 as of the end of November, ranked 4th in the world and 57.5 
times more than Tajikistan. The number of deaths exceeded 10,000 on October 6 and totaled 
12,155 at the end of November – 141 times more than Tajikistan.8  
In this study, we provide brand-new evidence on the impact of the COVID-19 on 
migration and household welfare using a dataset covering both before and after the pandemic, 
up to November 2020. To our knowledge, there has been little research on the impact of the 
pandemic in the post-COVID period using a dataset collected both before and after the outbreak 
                                                                                                                                
Coronavirus” (March 18),  
https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-workers-face-dire-future-as-russia-closes-borders-over-coronavirus/3049581
5.html. The article reports that the high season for many Tajik migrants to depart for Russia is from late 
March to the end of April and “large crowds of people gathered near the main ticket office at Dushanbe’s 
railway station on March 17, with people trying to get a refund for tickets they had bought in advance 
since now they are unable to enter Russia.” Many migrants tried to use trains or buses for Russia that take 
several days of travel through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, but those countries also shut their borders.  
7  According to Eurasianet, “Russia’s Interior Ministry told daily Moscow-based newspaper 
Komsomolskaya Pravda on April 3 that it is estimated there were still 507,000 Tajik nationals in the 
country. All routes home have been closed to them. The Tajik civilian aviation body on March 19 ruled 
that all air traffic would be suspended immediately as a protective measure. Trains were stopped too.” 
(“Coronavirus Leaves Tajikistan’s Labor Migrants High and Dry: Those who made it to Russia Before 
the Scale of the Crisis Became Evident are now Stranded” (April 20),  
https://eurasianet.org/coronavirus-leaves-tajikistans-labor-migrants-high-and-dry. The article also reports 
that Tajikistan's ambassador to Russia asked the heads of companies in Russia to refrain from laying off 
Tajik workers. According to Nikkei Asian Review, “Last year, there were around 500,000 Tajik migrants 
working in Russia, but many of them are now stuck in Tajikistan.”  
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Tajikistan-finally-confronts-virus-as-Central-Asian-econom
ies-reel 




began.9 Among the few papers related to international migration, Barker et al. (2020) used 
panel data in Bangladesh and Nepal to show a decline in earnings and a greater prevalence of 
food insecurity among households with migrants up to June, 2020. Mobarak, Mushfiq, and 
Vernot (2020) show a decline in labor supply in the village, labor migration, remittance earnings, 
and total incomes in rural Nepal in May 2020. Honorati, Yi, and Choi (2020) report that half of 
the Armenian workers expecting to migrate were not able to leave for Russia and lost their jobs 
because of the suspension of construction activities as of June, which would result in reduced 
remittances.10 These papers commonly focused on the very early impact of COVID-19 in 
spring and found sharp and adverse effects on household income and food security. Building on 
those papers, we contribute to both policy debates and academic literature in the following 
ways.  
First, our study is empowered by a unique high-frequency household panel dataset that 
covers the period both before and after the outbreak began. The distinct advantage of the dataset 
is the monthly collection of data, to cover the “with-COVID-19” period up to November 2020, 
which allows us to explore the impact of the COVID-19 on a variety of outcomes over a longer 
time-frame than previous studies. To our knowledge, little research examines the effect of the 
pandemic up to this autumn.  
Second, we use a monthly household-level dataset in Tajikistan starting in 2015, which 
means we are able to detect any changes in seasonal patterns of a variety of outcomes caused by 
the new pandemic. The dataset contains a wide variety of variables related to household welfare, 
enabling us to explore comprehensive impacts of the pandemic at the household level, and the 
                                            
9 UNDP (2020) reports that the pandemic has negatively affected women’s vulnerability and decreased 
income from self-employment, informal or migrant labor and non-registered jobs. 
10 Although not focusing on migration, Baker et al. (2020) and Chen, Qian, and Wen (2020) employed 
high-frequency data to examine the impact on household spending using a dataset covering the period 
after the outbreak. Kansiime et al. (2021) warned of a decline in earnings and increased food insecurity in 
Kenya and Uganda using data collected up to April. Amare et al. (2020) found greater food insecurity in 
Nigeria using data collected up to May. Murakami, Shimizutani, and Yamada (2020) used a pre-COVID 
dataset to estimate that remittance inflows will decrease by 14–20% due to the pandemic, and household 
spending per capita will decline by 1–2% in the Philippines.  
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high frequency improves the efficiency of econometric estimates by capturing larger variations 
in household behavior. 
Third, our dataset is longitudinal, which allows us to take an empirical approach to 
establish a relationship between remittances and household welfare in a more rigorous way, 
since longitudinal data enables us to correct unobserved factors and address endogeneity using 
exogenous shocks to households. 11  Yang (2008) examined the effect of international 
remittances on households using the appreciation of the Philippine peso during the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis and found that remittances did not have a significant effect on household 
consumption but positive and a significant impact on capital accumulation, entrepreneurship, 
and educational spending. Since the outbreak of COVID-19 is exogenous to each household, we 
can overcome identification issues pointed to in the previous literature.   
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the dataset used in this study. 
Section 3 presents seasonal patterns of variables related to household welfare and compares 
them in regular years and 2020. Section 4 describes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
migration and remittance inflow. Section 5 examines the relationship between remittances and 
household welfare on a variety of measures. Section 6 provides some concluding comments and 
assesses approaches to future research.  
 
2. Data description 
 
We use monthly household-level panel data from the Listening to Tajikistan (L2TJK) survey. 
The first 30 rounds were compiled by the World Bank between May 2015 and November 2017 
and the subsequent rounds have been financed jointly by the World Bank, UNICEF, and the 
                                            
11 There have been a variety of studies reporting the positive impact of remittances on household welfare 
in Vietnam (Amare and Hohfeld 2016; Cuong and Linh 2018), Pakistan (Javed, Awan, and Waqas 2017), 
Bangladesh (Wadood and Hossain 2017), Kenya (Jena 2018), Malawi (Kangmennaang, Bezner-Kerr, and 
Luginaah 2018). However, their empirical methodology is less rigorous, using cross-sectional data, and 
most of them employ the PSM (propensity score matching) method because of difficulty in finding valid 




JICA Ogata Research Institute. All rounds of the survey are conducted by phone and cover a 
wide variety of variables, including migration, income and employment, and the wellbeing and 
life satisfaction of households. The 31st and subsequent rounds have added more questions 
related to migration and remittances, while the rounds from April 2020 and later included 
questions on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The most recent survey month is 
November 2020, and the dataset thus covers more than half a year after the outbreak.  
The sample of the survey is nationally representative 800 households that were 
randomly drawn from a nationally representative survey consisting of 3,000 households in the 
spring of 2015 conducted on a face-to-face basis. Households were interviewed at 10-day 
intervals, which changed to two-week intervals after the sixth round of the data collection, and 
one-month intervals since November 2015. Households who refused to participate were 
replaced with households from the same primary sampling unit (PSU). In each round, the 
respondents are asked to provide information on a variety of household characteristics and their 
perception of food security and economic well-being as well as migration and remittances. Note 
that most of the variables are collected at the household level, not at the individual level.   
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. All variables 
reported are binary. The first set of variables is related to households’ migration status. On 
average, 29.8% of households have at least one migrant member in the survey month and 27.8% 
on average had received remittances in the month.12 12.6% of households answered that they 
have at least one migrant household member who currently has a job in the destination country. 
We include a wide range of outcomes related to household welfare in the analyses. They include 
food security, finance for basic needs, consumption, health and healthcare, and subjective 
perceptions of financial well-being and economic well-being, which are explained below.  
 
                                            
12 The survey only asks about the receipt of remittances in the previous 10 days, despite the frequency of 
interviews being about 1 month. We recovered information of the remittance receipts from the previous 1 
month by imputation using the receipt in the previous 10 days and question asking whether the remittance 
increased or decreased compared to the previous month.  
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3. Seasonal patterns of household welfare  
 
This section describes the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on a variety of household welfare 
outcomes by comparing the seasonal patterns in between “regular” years without the pandemic 
and 2020 with the pandemic. We define “regular” years as the average of 2018 and 2019.13 In 
all figures, we standardize the value of January as one and depict seasonal movements in 
subsequent months by contrasting households with migrants to households without migrants 
using weights to each household. Thus, each graph has four lines. We take three-month moving 
average for all series to make the seasonal pattern clear.  
 
(1) Food security 
 
The first two graphs report the proportion of households that were able to buy enough food for 
members for the previous ten days and that were not able to buy enough food for the children in 
the same period. We see a decline of the share of households able to buy enough food for 
members in a parallel way to April and the share recovered faster for households with migrants. 
This is also the case for the proportion of households unable to buy enough food for the children. 
The share increased for both households and peaked out earlier for migrant-sending households 
in April, with a faster decline for those households up to the level observed in regular years. In 
contrast, the proportion ceased to fall and leveled off in autumn at a higher level for households 
without migrants.14  
 
(2) Finance for basic needs  
 
The left-hand side graph shows the proportion of households financially unable to pay for 
utilities in the previous ten days. A rapid increase in 2020 is observed for both households with 
                                            
13 We limit the regular years to 2018 and 2019 because some variables have been collected only after the 
middle of 2017.  
14 The appendix figures and tables show the development of detailed food security measures under the 
COVID-19 pandemic. We see a similar pattern: food security worsened at the same pace or faster for 




and without migrants up to May. The right-hand side reports the share of households borrowing 
any money to pay for basic needs over the previous ten days increased in spring at a faster rate 
for households with migrants. At a glance, migrant-sending households were worse off than 
households without migrants, but we note that those households had fewer liquidity constraints 
and found it easier to borrow than non-migrant households. By autumn, the proportion was 
returning to the regular pattern in both households with and without migrants. The pattern of 
households toward borrowing is similar to that of households selling assets to pay for basic 




The left-hand side graph shows that the proportion of households who reduced consumption of 
food to pay for other needs over the previous ten days increased rapidly up to May for both 
households with and without migrants and then declined at a faster speed for households with 
migrants. The right-hand side reports that the share of households whose children ate less than 
three times on most days over the previous ten days increased faster for households with 
migrants and peaked out in June. However, the decline of the proportion was more gradual than 
in households that reduced food consumption, while the level relative to January has been 
higher. The proportion for households without migrants moved together with households with 
migrants. The proportion of households that reduced payments (medications, hospitalization, 
missed doctor’s visits) for healthcare to pay for other needs over the previous ten days is not 
much different from regular years for both households with and without migrants (not shown).  
 
(4) Health and healthcare 
 
The left-hand side graph shows the proportion of households with any member who has been 
sick over the previous ten days and tracks the regular seasonal pattern in both migrant and 
non-migrant households. We do not see any different seasonal pattern in 2020 under the 
pandemic. This is the same for the proportion of households that reduced health expenditure as 
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depicted on the right-hand side. It shows a gradual decline in subsequent months for both 
households with and without migrants. At a glance, there is no serious effect from the 
COVID-19 pandemic on health status and use of health care and no distinction is observed 
between households with and without migrants. 
 
(5) Financial Wellbeing  
 
The proportion of households thinking that the current financial condition is worse than the 
previous month (left-hand side) started to expand rapidly in 2020, compared to a gradual decline 
month-by-month in regular years. The share increased three-fold in April relative to January for 
both households with and without migrants, but we observe the proportion peaked out in May 
for households with migrants earlier than households without migrants in June. We note that the 
proportion leveled off in October. On the other hand, the proportion of households expecting 
financial conditions to get worse in the next month (right-hand side) is higher for migrant 
households; the share peaks out in April for them and declines faster than non-migrant 
households. These observations suggest that, under the pandemic, the financial wellbeing of 
households with migrants at present got out of the worst earlier. They also had greater anxiety 
about the future at the onset but this pessimistic view was weak by early summer. However, we 
should pay attention to the cessation in decline in autumn.  
 
(6) Economic wellbeing 
 
The left-hand side graph shows the proportion of households that think the economic wellbeing 
of their household is poor, and the right-hand side graph depicts households that believe the 
current economic conditions in the city or area where they live are bad or very bad. For the 
perception of being poor, the share started to increase in households both with and without 
migrants, contrasting with the decline in regular years, while households with migrants peaked 
out earlier in April. We note that the conversion to the regular seasonal pattern stopped in 
autumn, and there is a surge in the proportion of households that think the area’s economic 
 
 14 
condition is bad. The observed patterns are similar to those of other economic measures, 
including financial well-being, food security and consumption. The share of households that are 
unsatisfied with life increases with the COVID-19 pandemic, in contrast to regular years, as 
depicted in the third figure in the panel (6) of Figure 2. Similar to perceptions of economic 
conditions, the negative feeling peaks out around May. In contrast, the proportion of households 
that think now is a bad time to find a job in the city or area where they live today, the fourth figure, 




The left-hand side graph shows the proportion of households that did any paid work in the 
previous seven days. Reflecting the economic downturn during the pandemic, the proportion 
started to increase from April at a slower speed for households with migrants and was lower for 
households without migrants in spring. The proportion of households with migrants started to 
catch up to the regular pattern in autumn, while that for households without migrants bottomed 
out in May. The right-hand side graph shows the proportion of households that received a wage in 
the previous ten days. The proportion declined sharply for households with migrants and 
bottomed out in June. The proportion for households without migrants is not worse compared to 
regular years.  
 
(8) Children  
 
The two graphs show outcomes related to children. The left-hand side graph shows the proportion 
of households with any child who had been ill in the previous ten days. We see the same pattern in 
2020 with the regular years in both migrant and non-migrant households, which have been lower 
than regular years sinceMay.15 The right-hand side graph shows the proportion of households 
with any child who received skills development out of school. In regular years, the proportion 
                                            
15 The trend in the proportion of households that could pay for a child’s medical care and households 
with any child who received any medical care is very similar to that of a child’s sickness (not shown).  
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peaks out in February-March and follows a declining trend. In this year, the proportion started to 
increase rapidly for households with migrants. The proportion declined for households without 
migrants up to spring and recovered afterward. 
Those simple calculations show that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic was 
temporarily serious in terms of economic measures in March to May, but it seems that 
households with migrants emerged from their worst difficulties earlier and have been recovering 
to meet the regular seasonal pattern. Households without migrants are also returning to the 
regular pattern, but lagging behind households with migrants. On the other hand, we do not see 
any distinct difference in health status or medical care. We observe a severe drop in household 
welfare in spring, as the previous studies confirmed. What is newly found in this study is that 
household welfare measured in a variety of outcomes is now normalizing. These observations 
may be counterintuitive, since many of those expecting to migrate were forced to stay in their 
home country due to travel restrictions and border closures, which would be plausibly 
detrimental to remittance inflows this year.16 In order to understand the mechanism, we 
examine the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration and remittance in the next 
section.17 
 
4. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration and remittances  
 
This section examines the impact of the pandemic on migration and remittances. As described in 
the introduction, there have been many anecdotal episodes on the difficulty of expecting 
migrants to head for a destination, which is especially the case for mid-March, when Russia 
closed its international borders. We will review the status of international migration in our 
dataset below. 
                                            
16 Using the same dataset, World Bank (2020d) also points out that food security was worsening, 
following an unprecedented trend, in March and April, but that it would be somewhat eased later.  
17 In addition to the variables presented, the survey has questions related to children, such as whether 
they missed school due to financial reasons or whether children worked to help with household income. 
However, we dropped these outcomes from the analyses because there were very few cases that applied to 
such unfavorable conditions, making it difficult to properly analyze the trend.  
 
 16 
The upper part of Figure 3 describes the stock, departure, and return of international 
migrants. The stock is defined as the (normalized) number of migrants as a proportion of the total 
population who are in the destination country in the month. The destination includes all countries, 
although most migrants are concentrated in Russia. Departure refers to the (normalized) number 
of migrants who have newly entered their destination countries in the month, and the return is the 
(normalized) number of migrants who have left their destination countries and returned to 
Tajikistan in the month. Both the departure and return also normalized as a ratio to total 
population. The stock in a month corresponds to the stock in the previous month, and adding the 
number of departures and subtracting the number of returns.  
We observe a distinct seasonal pattern in the number of departures, returns and stock in 
regular years. The number of departures surpasses the number of returns in the first half of the 
year and the number of returns exceeds the number of departures in the second half. As a result, 
we see a seasonality to indicate that the stock of migrants in destination countries starts to increase 
in spring, stays high in summer, declines in autumn and reaches a low in winter. This pattern is 
obscured in 2018, which witnessed a large depreciation of the Russian ruble and a break in 
large-scale construction following the 2018 World Cup Soccer games, factors that hampered 
international migration.  
We can see a different pattern in those numbers in 2020. The distinct feature of this year is 
that the numbers of both departures and returns are at a lower level compared to previous years. 
The number of departures declined in the first few months of 2020, contrasting to the regular 
increasing pattern observed in 2017 and 2019. The change in the trend is mostly a result of the 
border closures in mid-March 2020; many expecting migrants were forced to stay in the country 
because of the strict border closures and bans on international mobility. However, this is one side 
of a coin that captures inflow to the stock of migrants only. On the flip side, many migrants 
expecting to return to Tajikistan were not able to go back and were forced to stay in the destination 
countries, mostly in Russia, and thus the outflow of stock of migrants was also affected. Indeed, 
the number of returns also declined after the closure. The number of returns bottomed out in 
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spring and started to increase in subsequent months, and the number of departures that had lagged 
for a couple of months started to rebound in July.  
The stock of Tajik migrants, which was high in 2019, has remained at a high level since 
the beginning of 2020. While both the numbers of departures and returns declined in 2020, the 
number of departures surpassed the number of returns in the first couple of months of 2020. As a 
result, we see a large stock of migrants in 2020 during the outbreak of the pandemic, despite the 
flow of migrants (i.e., the number of departures) being significantly reduced since April 2020. 
The large stock of migrants in 2020 might be counterintuitive but is well explained by the sharp 
decline in both numbers of departures and returns. 
One might argue that, even if the stock of migrants was not seriously affected by the 
pandemic, there might be a portion of migrants who were unemployed in their destination 
countries due to the COVID-19 pandemic, because the economy of destination countries was also 
seriously affected. The lower part of Figure 3 describes the monthly employment rate of migrants 
and the monthly inflow of remittances, both of which are smoothed by taking a three-month 
moving average. The employment rate is defined as the proportion of migrants who were working 
in a survey month among the stock of migrants. The amount of remittances is calculated from 
survey responses asking how much remittances the household received in the previous ten days in 
Tajikistan somoni. The value is converted to a per household base dividing the total remittances 
by the number of households in the survey.  
In regular years, the employment rate has been high and stable at around 80% to 90%. In 
2020, we observe a sharp and large decline in the rate to a historically low level of around 30% in 
March and April, presumably because of the sharp economic downturn in Russia following the 
onset of the pandemic. However, we see a quick recovery of the employment rates of migrants 
from May, exceeding 80% in summer, which is by no means inferior to regular years. We see a 
large adverse shock on the employment rate caused by the pandemic in spring but the effect was 
only transitory.  
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The trend of the monthly remittance inflow is not much different from that of regular 
years, which fluctuates in a range between 7,000 to 9,000 somoni depending on the exchange rate 
and the seasonal change in the stock of migrants. In2020, we see a large downside shock, with the 
remittance inflow declining substantially along with the substantial reduction in the employment 
rate. This was the case up until April, but we observe a rapid recovery from May to reach the 
regular level.   
In sum, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration and remittances is sharp but 
transitory from March to May. Starting with a higher level at the beginning of 2020, the stock of 
migrants did not undergo a large decline because both departures and returns were reduced by the 
border closure and travel restriction. We see a sharp and adverse impact of the pandemic on the 
employment rate of migrants to a historically low level, but the employment rate quickly 
recovered to the same level as regular years in summer. The amount of remittance inflows 
substantially declined in March and April but rapidly regained their regular level in summer.  
Therefore, we see that the impact of the pandemic on migration and remittance inflows 
was sharply detrimental to households in spring, but the effect was transitory, which conforms to 
the World Bank’s latest estimates on remittance inflow as of October (World Bank 2020c). They 
were revised upwardly compared with those as of April (World Bank 2020b) and less 
pessimistic. However, the stock of international migrants is likely to decline in 2020 for the first 
time in recent history.18 Looking at Tajikistan, remittance inflows will decrease to 2,066 million 
dollars in 2020 from 2,322 million dollars in 2019, an 11% decline, and the remittance inflows 
relative to GDP in 2020 are estimated to be 26.2%, only 2% points lower than 28.2% in 2019.  
 
5. Migration, remittance and household welfare after COVID-19 
 
In this section, we examine the relationship between a variety of outcomes related to household 
welfare and household status of migration and remittance through the pandemic. The purpose of 
                                            
18 World Bank (2020c) reports that remittance flows to low and middle-income countries are projected to 
fall by 7% in 2020 (20 percent as of April) and by 8% in Central Asia.  
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regression analysis is to understand whether the households sending migrant and receiving 
remittances are better-off or not during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic. More precisely, we 
investigate whether there is any significant difference in the outcomes between households with 
migrants/remittances and those without them in the period after the onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic.  
 
5.1 Full sample analysis (monthly) 
 
First, we conduct an analysis to see how the implications of migration and remittances differ 
across months after April 2020 compared to regular years. For this purpose, we estimate the 
following equation:  
 
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = � 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷(𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝐶𝐶∈ℂ 
∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) + � 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
𝐶𝐶∈ℂ 
+ 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗
+ 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 
(1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  is the outcome variable, 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is migration (or remittance) status of the 
household 𝑗𝑗 in the month 𝑀𝑀. It takes 1 if the household 𝑗𝑗 has a migrant member or receives 
remittances, and 0 otherwise. 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 indicates whether 𝑀𝑀 is a specific month after the COVID-19 
pandemic began where 𝐶𝐶 is an element of the set ℂ such that 
𝐶𝐶 ∈ {ℂ: 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴20,𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑌𝑌20, 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽20, 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑌𝑌20,𝐴𝐴𝐽𝐽𝐴𝐴20, 𝑆𝑆𝐽𝐽𝐴𝐴20,𝑂𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂20,𝐽𝐽𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁20} 
 
For example, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴20𝑗𝑗 takes 1 if 𝑀𝑀 is April 2020, and it takes 0 otherwise. 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶 captures 
overall impact specific to month 𝐶𝐶  in 2020, conditional on the year trend and seasonality 
captured by the data before 2019. 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 then represents the differential impact of migration or 
remittances in the month of 𝐶𝐶 since April 2020. 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the migration (or remittance) status of the 
household 𝑗𝑗 in the month 𝑀𝑀. 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is a vector of covariates that may affect the outcome variables. 
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We include the incidence of disruption in the electricity and water supply services in the previous 
month because these can be a source of noise for the well-being of the household. 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 and 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑗𝑗 are the year and month fixed effect, respectively. 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 is the household fixed effect, which 
addresses time-invariant characteristics of each household that can be correlated with both 
migration and remittance decisions as well as the outcomes. 19  
This empirical specification is designed to detect any significant changes in seasonality in 
2020. Table 2 presents the estimation results. First, we observe overall negative shock on a variety 
of welfare outcomes of Tajik households since the COVID-19 pandemic started, which is shown 
by the coefficients on APR20 – NOV20. Column (1) shows that the probability of households 
being able to buy enough food has been significantly lower from August to November 2020.20 
The coefficients are positive and significant in Column (2), showing a significantly higher 
probability that households were not able to buy enough food for children. Under the 
“with-COVID-19” period since April 2020, households underwent significantly unfavorable 
conditions in them being unable to pay for utilities (Column (3)), increasing borrowing to meet 
daily needs (Column (4)), reducing food consumption (Column (5)), and increasing incidents 
where a child cannot eat three times a day (Column (6)). However, in most cases, we do not see 
significant coefficients in health and health care (Columns (7) and (8)) in most cases. The 
subjective perceptions of financial and economic wellbeing are also significantly worse, and are 
reported in Columns (9) to (14).21  
Second, despite these overall negative impacts during the with-COVID-19 period, 
households with migrants are in general better-off for some outcomes. Households with migrants 
                                            
19 Household-level fixed effect estimations are implemented by a within-estimator by subtracting 
household-level means of all variables from each observation. While the dependent variables are binary 
we do not employ the methods for limited dependent variables such as logit and probit, since it is difficult 
to interpret the estimated coefficients of such non-linear models if the variable(s) of interest is the 
interaction term(s) like in our case (Ai and Norton 2003). In our linear probability model, we can interpret 
the coefficients as the mean difference of the outcome variable between the group whose interaction term 
is one and the group with zero, conditional on other covariates and fixed effects. 
20 The coefficients in April to June are positive and significant, which is reversed in the sub-sample 
analysis.  




are less likely to fail in supplying enough food for family members and children in autumn 
(Columns (1) and (2)), paying for utilities in May and September to November (Column (3))22 
and reducing food consumption in November (Column (5)). They are also less likely to fail as 
households with migrants tend to be healthier (Column (7)) and were more likely to avoid 
reducing healthcare expenditure in some months (Column (8)). Furthermore, households with 
migrants are less pessimistic during this hard time. Compared to non-migrant households, 
migrant households are significantly less inclined to answer that the financial situation is 
becoming worse (Column (9), that they are poor (Column (11)), that the economy of the area they 
live will further deteriorate (Column (13)), and that area’s job situation is bad (Column (14)).  
This resilience of migrant households seems to stem from the remittances they continue 
receiving even after the COVID-19 severely hit Russia and the border closed in March. Table 3 
reports the estimation results on the impact of remittances. We observe that coefficients on APR20 
– NOV20 in a variety of welfare outcomes in Columns (1) to (6) imply that these outcomes 
worsened during the months after April 2020. At the same time, the coefficients on the interaction 
term of remittances and months are negative and significant in Columns (3), (4), (6), (7) and (8), 
suggesting that the overall unfavorable shocks on these outcome variables are mitigated for 
households receiving remittances, compared to households not receiving remittances. The same 
argument applies to the subjective perception of financial and economic wellbeing in Columns (9) 
to (14). Compared to non-receiving households, remittance-receiving households during the time 
of COVID-19 are less pessimistic about current and future financial conditions (Columns (9)). 
They are less likely to think they are poor (Column (11)) and they are more optimistic about the 
economic and employment situation of their living area (Columns (13) and (14)). These results 
are consistent with UNDP (2020), showing that remittances continue to play a significant role in 
consumption.  
 
                                            
22 Due to the structural problems in the dataset, the observations in July and August are missing for the 
variables of columns (3) – (5). 
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5.2 Sub-sample analysis (monthly) 
 
Next, we turn to the sub-sample analysis. The coefficients 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷  in equation (1) are properly 
identified if the interaction term (𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) is not correlated with the unobservable. This condition 
can be violated in several ways. First, the time-invariant characteristics of each household can be 
correlated with both migration and remittance decisions as well as the outcomes. This is 
addressed in equation (1) by introducing the household fixed effect, 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗. The second threat is 
reverse causality. The key motivation for sending migrants is to improve household economic 
welfare in their home country through remittances. Hence, changes in migration status and 
remittances can be the consequences of household welfare outcomes. Lastly, there could be 
regional/industry-specific shocks that may simultaneously affect migration/remittance and 
household outcomes.  
In order to address these identification concerns, we conduct a sub-sample analysis on a 
subset of the households that sent migrants in 2019, in addition to the introduction of household 
fixed effect. These households are more likely to rely on migration compared to those that have 
never sent migrants during the study period since 2015. Among those households dependent on 
migration and remittances, reverse causality and selection bias of estimation should be much less 
serious, because they should share similar unobserved characteristics affecting migration. 
Table 4 and Table 5 report the estimation results. In general, the results are qualitatively 
identical with the full sample results, which is the case for both migration and remittances. More 
precisely, payment to utilities and whether a child cannot eat 3 times a day gain significance 
(columns (3) and (6)), implying that households with migrants and remittances were better-off 
during the “with-COVID-19” period for these aspects of economic outcome. In contrast, most of 
the coefficients in columns (1), (2), and (8) lose significance. 
 
5.3 Overall effect under the “with-COVID-19” period 
 
In addition to the monthly-base analysis, we examine the overall effect of the pandemic after the 
onset of the pandemic. We aim at identifying how households with migrant/remittances are 
 
 23 
better-off or not throughout the with-COVID-19 period. For this purpose, we estimate the 
following equation: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽(𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗) + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜂𝜂𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑗𝑗
+ 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (2) 
 
where  𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗  is a binary taking 1 if 𝑀𝑀 is April 2020 or later. Since strict border 
controls were introduced in late March and the first case of COVID-19 was officially reported at 
the end of April in Tajikistan, we regard April as the month when Tajikistan went into the 
“with-COVID-19” period. 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  is a vector of covariates that are likely to affect the outcome 
variables, including the incidence of disruption in the electricity and water supply services in the 
previous month. 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑟𝑟𝑗𝑗 and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝑗𝑗 are the year and month fixed effect and 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗is the household 
fixed effect. 𝛽𝛽 is the coefficient of interest, which captures the impact of migration/remittances 
during the “with-COVID-19” period on the outcome variables.  
Again, the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is properly identified if the interaction term (𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗) is 
not correlated with the unobservable. Thus, in addition to the sub-sample analysis, we also 
employ an instrumenting strategy as explained below. As seen in Section 4, migration flow has a 
clear seasonality in terms of the number of departures and returns. In fact, each migrant has his or 
her own seasonal pattern of migration; every year, they depart to the destination in the same 
period of a year, and they return as such. Therefore, the choice of whether or not to migrate/remit 
in the same month as the previous year is a good predictor of whether or not to migrate/remit this 
month. We thus pick 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−12 , the migration/remittance status 12 months before from 𝑀𝑀, as the 
candidate of the instrument for 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗. Of course, previous migration/remittances experience can 
affect the current economic outcome, not through the current migration/remittances. This will fail 
the exclusion restriction and make 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−12 invalid as the instrument. To address this concern, we 
need to include variable(s) related to past migration/remittance experiences as the covariates of 
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the estimation equation so that 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−12 only captures the seasonality pattern of migration and 
remittances, apart from migration/emittance experiences. The estimation equation is 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽�𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗� + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜉𝜉1𝐴𝐴_𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜉𝜉1𝐶𝐶_𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗




Where (𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗)  and 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  are the endogenous variables and instrumented by 
(𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−12 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗), 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗,𝑗𝑗−12 , and the exchange rate between Tajikistan somoni and Russian 
rubles. 𝐴𝐴_𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  and 𝐶𝐶_𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  are the covariates to control for past migration/remittance 
experience. 𝐴𝐴_𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  is a binary variable indicating whether they had migration/remittances 
experiences in the preceding 12 months of 𝑀𝑀. 𝐶𝐶_𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is the cumulative number of months in 
which 𝑗𝑗 had migrant(s) or received remittances in the preceding 12 months of 𝑀𝑀. The notation for 
the remaining variables is identical in (2).  
Table 6 summarizes the results. It stacks only the coefficient of interest, 𝛽𝛽, which is 
obtained by estimating equations (2) and (3). Panel I shows the results of the full sample analysis 
as a benchmark. Panel II presents the results of the subsample analysis and Panel III reports the 
results of 2SLS estimation using the instrumental variables. The results are naturally consistent 
with the analyses in the previous subsection. Panels I and II reveal that households with migrants 
or receiving remittances are better off during the “with-COVID-19” period in terms of fulfilling 
the payment needs for utilities (Column (3)), borrowing money for basic needs (Column (4)), 
feeding children three times a day (Column (6)), health and healthcare expenses (Columns (7) and 
(8)). They are also less pessimistic as shown in columns (9), (11), (13) and (14) of the panels I and 
II of Table 6. Panel III shows that migrants mitigated the propensity to reduce food consumption 
(Column (5)) and to have a sick household member (Column (7)), while remittance inflows eased 
feeding for children (Column (2)), utility payments (Column (3)), food consumption (Column 
(5)), and health (Column (7)). 
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6. Conclusion  
 
This paper examines the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on a variety of economic outcomes 
on household welfare by using a unique high-frequency household panel dataset that covers a 
period both before and after the outbreak. We provide brand-new evidence. First, the adverse 
effect of the pandemic was severe in April and May in 2020, but the magnitude of the adverse 
effect gradually diminished in subsequent months. Second, contrasting to expectation, the 
pandemic had a sharp but only transitory effect on the number of migrants temporarily staying 
abroad. A portion of expected migrants could not make their departure to the destination country 
(mainly the Russian Federation) under the border closures, while some of the migrants 
expecting to return were also stuck in the destination country. Third, despite a sharp decline in 
employment and the remittances of migrants in April and May, they quickly recovered. 
Regression analyses confirmed migration and remittances had eased the economic shock of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in terms of not only material well-being such as food, utilities, 
consumption, and health but also their views on their financial and economic situations. These 
findings show that the unfavorable effect of the COVID-19 pandemic was severe and temporary 
right after the outbreak, but households with migrants were more resilient against the pandemic, 
since migration and remittance served as a form of insurance. 
While this study contributes to deepening our understanding of the short-term economic 
impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is still too early to conclude what the mid- and long-term 
consequences may be. This paper shows that the impacts change over time and even flip within 
this short period of time. In addition, as Asian Development Bank (2020) describes, there are 
various anecdotal accounts suggesting that many migrants have been stranded at the airports or 
have been working under unfavorable hygienic condition without sufficient access to healthcare 
services in the destination countries. Some other migrants have trouble with sending remittances 
due to the lack of access to digital means for remittances. These potential cost and burden on 
migrants and their families during this COVID-19 time are not fully considered in this study. 
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We thus need to undertake further efforts to collect data over a longer period to understand the 
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Figure 1: Number of newly confirmed cases and deaths in Tajikistan and Russia 
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Figure 2: Seasonal patterns of variables related to household welfare 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N mean sd 
        
Migration Variables 
   Household has migrant member in this month 70,783 0.298 0.457 
Household received some amount of remittance in this 
month 
70,783 0.278 0.448 
Migrant member is currently working in the destination 
country 
58,346 0.126 0.332 
 
   
Economic Outcome Variables    
(1) Food Security    
Able to buy enough food for members for the past month 70,783 0.826 0.379 
Not able to buy enough food for the children in the 
household 
60,336 0.0706 0.256 
(2) Finance for basic needs    
Financially unable to pay for utilities for the past month? 68,380 0.295 0.456 
Borrowed any money over the previous month to pay for 
basic needs? 
68,380 0.262 0.440 
(3) Consumption    
Reduced Food consumption past month 68,380 0.337 0.473 
Child ate less than 3 times a day 60,336 0.167 0.373 
(4) Health and medical care    
Any household member been sick 70,783 0.431 0.495 
Reduced healthcare expenditure 70,783 0.289 0.453 
(5) Subjective Financial well-being    
Thinking current financial condition is worse compared 
with previous month 
70,783 0.135 0.342 
Expecting financial situation to get worse in the next 
month 
70,783 0.0885 0.284 
(6) Subjective Economic well-being    
Perceives own household as poor 62,923 0.359 0.480 
Unsatisfied with life 62,923 0.0959 0.294 
Perceives living area's economic condition is bad 62,923 0.168 0.374 
Area's job situation is bad 62,923 0.451 0.498 
(7) Employment     
Did work for pay in previous 7 days 70,783 0.783 0.412 
Received wage in previous 10 days 70,783 0.136 0.343 
(8) Child    
Child has been ill 60,336 0.201 0.401 
Child received skills’ development 52,581 0.0501 0.218 





Table 2: Impact of migration on household welfare during the with-COVID-19’ period (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Food Security Finance for Basic Needs Consumption Healthcare 
VARIABLES Able to buy 
enough food 
Not able to buy 
enough food for 
children 
Financially unable 
to pay for utilities 
Borrowed money 
for basic needs 
Reduced food 
consumption 
Child ate less than 
3 times a day 
Any household 
member been sick 
Reduced healthcare 
expenditure 
         
Migrants X APR2020 -0.0104 0.0262 -0.0139 -0.00115 0.00157 -0.0262 -0.0362 -0.0226 
 (0.0268) (0.0178) (0.0246) (0.0243) (0.0282) (0.0275) (0.0272) (0.0511) 
Migrants X MAY2020 -0.0297 -0.00853 -0.0498** -0.00780 -0.0131 -0.0418 -0.0316 -0.0303 
 (0.0260) (0.0145) (0.0245) (0.0251) (0.0278) (0.0273) (0.0270) (0.0505) 
Migrants X JUN2020 -0.00464 -0.0174 -0.0288 -0.0252 0.00265 0.0155 -0.0372 -0.0658 
 (0.0268) (0.0132) (0.0261) (0.0256) (0.0282) (0.0292) (0.0267) (0.0546) 
Migrants X JUL2020 -0.0392 -0.0170    -0.0192 -0.0663*** -0.105** 
 (0.0262) (0.0122)    (0.0278) (0.0256) (0.0528) 
Migrants X AUG2020 -0.00284 -0.00312    -0.0124 -0.0563** 0.0249 
 (0.0273) (0.0138)    (0.0280) (0.0269) (0.0515) 
Migrants X SEP2020 -0.0522* -0.0154 -0.0454** -0.0331 0.00588 0.0175 -0.0341 -0.0140 
 (0.0268) (0.0121) (0.0230) (0.0225) (0.0263) (0.0281) (0.0263) (0.0553) 
Migrants X OCT2020 -0.0515* -0.0157 -0.0623*** -0.0743*** -0.0310 0.0305 -0.0699*** -0.00481 
 (0.0265) (0.0114) (0.0210) (0.0229) (0.0258) (0.0291) (0.0257) (0.0663) 
Migrants X NOV2020 -0.0412 -0.0292** -0.0514** -0.0353 -0.0555** 0.0164 -0.0525* -0.0428 
 (0.0262) (0.0117) (0.0240) (0.0238) (0.0269) (0.0288) (0.0274) (0.0658) 
APR2020 0.115*** 0.0398*** 0.0619*** 0.0319** 0.106*** 0.0590*** 0.00146 0.00637 
 (0.0157) (0.0112) (0.0163) (0.0157) (0.0173) (0.0186) (0.0180) (0.0339) 
MAY2020 0.0984*** 0.0375*** 0.102*** 0.0698*** 0.141*** 0.0980*** -0.00105 -0.00320 
 (0.0155) (0.0107) (0.0158) (0.0153) (0.0169) (0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0326) 
JUN2020 0.0337** 0.0261** 0.131*** 0.0817*** 0.110*** 0.0823*** -0.0416** -0.00320 
 (0.0161) (0.0104) (0.0168) (0.0164) (0.0181) (0.0185) (0.0182) (0.0371) 
JUL2020 0.00502 0.0402***    0.0440** -0.0269 0.0121 
 (0.0156) (0.0104)    (0.0175) (0.0182) (0.0394) 
AUG2020 -0.0901*** 0.0305***    0.0498*** -0.00771 -0.0141 
 (0.0164) (0.01000)    (0.0175) (0.0184) (0.0323) 
SEP2020 -0.0678*** 0.0347*** 0.0933*** 0.0201 0.0262 0.0196 -0.00439 0.00275 
 (0.0161) (0.00952) (0.0156) (0.0152) (0.0165) (0.0176) (0.0178) (0.0364) 
OCT2020 -0.0647*** 0.0477*** 0.0764*** 0.0493*** 0.0549*** 0.0192 -0.00599 0.0221 
 (0.0164) (0.00936) (0.0158) (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0419) 
NOV2020 -0.0657*** 0.0151* 0.0709*** 0.0269* 0.0678*** 0.00532 -0.0479** 0.0713* 
 (0.0156) (0.00915) (0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0169) (0.0188) (0.0373) 
         
Observations 70,598 55,256 68,195 68,195 68,195 55,256 70,598 30,272 
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Other explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, migration status, 
electricity outage, and water disruption. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator to subtract household-level means of 
variables from each observation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 36 
Table 2: Impact of migration on household welfare during the with-COVID-19 period (Full Sample, continued) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Perception of financial and economic situation of household and living area 
VARIABLES Current financial 
condition is worse than 
before 
Expecting financial 
condition gets worse 
Perceives own 
household as poor 





Perceives area’s job situation as 
bad 
       
Migrants X APR2020 -0.00115 0.00813 -0.0326 -0.0160 -0.0214 -0.0328 
 (0.0211) (0.0174) (0.0257) (0.0132) (0.0208) (0.0285) 
Migrants X MAY2020 -0.0379 -0.0147 -0.0191 -0.0174 -0.0271 -0.0710** 
 (0.0236) (0.0188) (0.0258) (0.0152) (0.0230) (0.0286) 
Migrants X JUN2020 -0.0587*** -0.0115 -0.0502** 0.0117 -0.0521** -0.0128 
 (0.0217) (0.0123) (0.0254) (0.0128) (0.0223) (0.0297) 
Migrants X JUL2020 -0.0433** -0.0173 -0.0224 -0.0192 -0.0457** -0.0199 
 (0.0209) (0.0145) (0.0253) (0.0130) (0.0201) (0.0286) 
Migrants X AUG2020 -0.0429** -0.0156 -0.0526** -0.00178 -0.00423 -0.0328 
 (0.0172) (0.0121) (0.0255) (0.0136) (0.0193) (0.0283) 
Migrants X SEP2020 -0.0137 0.00234 -0.0321 0.0129 -0.0440** -0.0599* 
 (0.0166) (0.0104) (0.0275) (0.0128) (0.0174) (0.0307) 
Migrants X OCT2020 -0.0129 0.00965 -0.0587** -0.00822 -0.0259 0.0130 
 (0.0172) (0.0112) (0.0273) (0.0130) (0.0211) (0.0300) 
Migrants X NOV2020 0.0112 -0.00489 -0.0591** 0.00636 0.00371 -0.0555* 
 (0.0228) (0.0159) (0.0279) (0.0141) (0.0254) (0.0305) 
APR2020 0.107*** 0.0724*** -0.0157 -0.00397 0.0122 0.0185 
 (0.0139) (0.0113) (0.0172) (0.0104) (0.0148) (0.0185) 
MAY2020 0.174*** 0.0715*** 0.0118 0.0283** 0.0834*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0125) (0.0161) (0.0113) (0.0147) (0.0180) 
JUN2020 0.134*** -0.0110 -0.0246 -0.0193** 0.0790*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0158) (0.00951) (0.0169) (0.00963) (0.0147) (0.0187) 
JUL2020 0.139*** 0.0374*** -0.0574*** -0.00562 0.0489*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0110) (0.0169) (0.0107) (0.0141) (0.0195) 
AUG2020 0.155*** 0.0818*** -0.0696*** -0.00441 0.00915 0.190*** 
 (0.0131) (0.00924) (0.0167) (0.00995) (0.0126) (0.0186) 
SEP2020 0.132*** 0.0698*** -0.0649*** -0.0108 0.0173 0.136*** 
 (0.0116) (0.00770) (0.0169) (0.00891) (0.0131) (0.0199) 
OCT2020 0.140*** 0.0657*** -0.0272 0.00750 0.0812*** 0.0706*** 
 (0.0121) (0.00747) (0.0177) (0.00999) (0.0139) (0.0196) 
NOV2020 0.175*** 0.0864*** -0.0388** -0.0132 0.0791*** -0.00552 
 (0.0137) (0.0101) (0.0175) (0.0103) (0.0145) (0.0178) 
       
Observations 70,598 70,598 62,772 62,772 62,772 62,772 
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Other explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, migration 
status, electricity outage, and water disruption. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator to subtract household-level means 
of variables from each observation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3: Impact of remittances on household welfare during the with-COVID-19 period (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Food Security Finance for Basic Needs Consumption Healthcare 
VARIABLES Able to buy 
enough food 




unable to pay 
for utilities 
Borrowed 




Child ate less 








         
Monthly remittance X APR2020 -0.0370 0.0329 -0.0711** -0.0452 0.0934*** -0.0496 -0.0458 -0.120** 
 (0.0250) (0.0232) (0.0289) (0.0287) (0.0347) (0.0314) (0.0338) (0.0561) 
Monthly remittance X MAY2020 0.0128 -0.0101 -0.102*** -0.0491* -0.00538 -0.0698** -0.0566* -0.0906 
 (0.0190) (0.0167) (0.0269) (0.0281) (0.0311) (0.0293) (0.0312) (0.0569) 
Monthly remittance X JUN2020 0.00370 -0.0184 -0.0847*** -0.0840*** -0.00331 -0.0238 -0.0275 -0.125** 
 (0.0168) (0.0140) (0.0274) (0.0262) (0.0299) (0.0306) (0.0289) (0.0540) 
Monthly remittance X JUL2020 0.00202 -0.00850    -0.0787*** -0.0683*** -0.119** 
 (0.0148) (0.0126)    (0.0277) (0.0262) (0.0517) 
Monthly remittance X AUG2020 -0.00683 -0.00494    -0.0492* -0.0681** -0.0528 
 (0.0164) (0.0137)    (0.0279) (0.0271) (0.0515) 
Monthly remittance X SEP2020 0.00358 -0.0181 -0.0453** -0.0349 0.00225 0.00280 -0.0397 -0.0416 
 (0.0156) (0.0117) (0.0229) (0.0224) (0.0261) (0.0281) (0.0261) (0.0557) 
Monthly remittance X OCT2020 -0.0245 -0.0140 -0.0688*** -0.0690*** -0.0196 0.0169 -0.0796*** -0.0250 
 (0.0160) (0.0116) (0.0208) (0.0230) (0.0262) (0.0292) (0.0258) (0.0671) 
Monthly remittance X NOV2020 0.0104 -0.0280** -0.0628*** -0.0418* -0.0552** 0.0131 -0.0530* -0.0231 
 (0.0149) (0.0117) (0.0239) (0.0238) (0.0269) (0.0290) (0.0275) (0.0663) 
APR2020 -0.0498*** 0.0428*** 0.0741*** 0.0424*** 0.0885*** 0.0548*** 0.00674 0.0222 
 (0.0120) (0.0104) (0.0153) (0.0147) (0.0161) (0.0172) (0.0169) (0.0313) 
MAY2020 -0.0529*** 0.0367*** 0.110*** 0.0794*** 0.137*** 0.0962*** 0.00678 0.00576 
 (0.0115) (0.0101) (0.0150) (0.0145) (0.0159) (0.0171) (0.0182) (0.0304) 
JUN2020 -0.0368*** 0.0250** 0.143*** 0.0951*** 0.111*** 0.0913*** -0.0436** 0.00779 
 (0.0114) (0.0102) (0.0164) (0.0158) (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0176) (0.0361) 
JUL2020 -0.0700*** 0.0370***    0.0601*** -0.0286 0.0113 
 (0.0114) (0.0102)    (0.0172) (0.0180) (0.0384) 
AUG2020 -0.0510*** 0.0309***    0.0602*** -0.00460 0.00920 
 (0.0115) (0.0100)    (0.0173) (0.0183) (0.0319) 
SEP2020 -0.0392*** 0.0353*** 0.0927*** 0.0204 0.0273* 0.0241 -0.00272 0.0104 
 (0.0115) (0.00960) (0.0156) (0.0152) (0.0165) (0.0175) (0.0178) (0.0359) 
OCT2020 -0.0326*** 0.0469*** 0.0775*** 0.0468*** 0.0511*** 0.0232 -0.00348 0.0268 
 (0.0108) (0.00929) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0412) 
NOV2020 -0.0450*** 0.0143 0.0732*** 0.0282* 0.0668*** 0.00626 -0.0482** 0.0646* 
 (0.0111) (0.00922) (0.0160) (0.0156) (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0188) (0.0373) 
         
Observations 70,598 55,256 68,195 68,195 68,195 55,256 70,598 30,272 
Source: Authors 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Other explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, Migration 
Status, electricity outage, and water disruption. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator to subtract household-level means 
of variables from each observation. This table reports the sub-sample analyses only with households that sent migrants in 2019. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 3: Impact of remittances on household welfare during the with-COVID-19 period (Full Sample, continued) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Perception of financial and economic situation of household and living area 
VARIABLES Current financial 
condition is worse than 
before 
Expecting financial 
condition gets worse 
Perceives own 
household as poor 
Own life perceived 
as unsatisfactory 
Perceives area’s 
economic condition is bad 
Perceives area’s job 
situation is bad 
       
Monthly remittance X APR2020 -0.00817 0.0472** -0.0883*** -0.0116 -0.0388 -0.100*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0234) (0.0297) (0.0151) (0.0245) (0.0341) 
Monthly remittance X MAY2020 -0.0854*** 0.00958 -0.0706** -0.0309** -0.0883*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0221) (0.0293) (0.0156) (0.0230) (0.0323) 
Monthly remittance X JUN2020 -0.0971*** -0.00754 -0.0708** 0.00729 -0.122*** -0.127*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0133) (0.0275) (0.0134) (0.0203) (0.0325) 
Monthly remittance X JUL2020 -0.0622*** -0.0398*** -0.0358 -0.0176 -0.0727*** -0.0498* 
 (0.0205) (0.0132) (0.0259) (0.0130) (0.0193) (0.0297) 
Monthly remittance X AUG2020 -0.0501*** -0.00704 -0.0641** -0.00469 -0.0280 -0.0401 
 (0.0165) (0.0121) (0.0258) (0.0134) (0.0187) (0.0291) 
Monthly remittance X SEP2020 -0.00574 0.00770 -0.0440 0.0163 -0.0458*** -0.0717** 
 (0.0166) (0.0101) (0.0275) (0.0129) (0.0172) (0.0308) 
Monthly remittance X OCT2020 -0.00694 0.0187 -0.0652** -0.00919 -0.0432** -0.00878 
 (0.0173) (0.0115) (0.0278) (0.0130) (0.0208) (0.0303) 
Monthly remittance X NOV2020 0.00235 0.00860 -0.0717** 6.04e-05 -0.0241 -0.0806*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0162) (0.0284) (0.0137) (0.0252) (0.0310) 
APR2020 0.105*** 0.0645*** -0.00871 -0.00857 0.0118 0.0314* 
 (0.0129) (0.0101) (0.0160) (0.00960) (0.0136) (0.0168) 
MAY2020 0.177*** 0.0631*** 0.0218 0.0283*** 0.0933*** 0.201*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0116) (0.0153) (0.0107) (0.0142) (0.0168) 
JUN2020 0.137*** -0.0140 -0.0232 -0.0179* 0.0919*** 0.152*** 
 (0.0152) (0.00902) (0.0162) (0.00914) (0.0145) (0.0177) 
JUL2020 0.142*** 0.0430*** -0.0546*** -0.00692 0.0549*** 0.180*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0111) (0.0165) (0.0104) (0.0141) (0.0189) 
AUG2020 0.156*** 0.0784*** -0.0674*** -0.00380 0.0159 0.192*** 
 (0.0130) (0.00908) (0.0165) (0.00988) (0.0125) (0.0183) 
SEP2020 0.129*** 0.0679*** -0.0618*** -0.0119 0.0173 0.139*** 
 (0.0115) (0.00772) (0.0168) (0.00886) (0.0130) (0.0198) 
OCT2020 0.137*** 0.0629*** -0.0262 0.00747 0.0857*** 0.0774*** 
 (0.0121) (0.00735) (0.0175) (0.00992) (0.0138) (0.0193) 
NOV2020 0.177*** 0.0823*** -0.0363** -0.0115 0.0868*** 0.000759 
 (0.0137) (0.00992) (0.0173) (0.0103) (0.0144) (0.0176) 
       
Observations 70,598 70,598 62,772 62,772 62,772 62,772 
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Other explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, Migration Status, electricity outage, 
and water disruption. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator, with household-level means of dependent and independent variables are 
subtracted from each observation. This table reports the sub-sample analyses only with households that sent migrants in 2019. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4: Impact of migration on household welfare during the with-COVID-19 period (sub-sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Food Security Finance for Basic Needs Consumption Healthcare 
VARIABLES Able to buy 
enough food 
Not able to buy 
enough food for 
children 
Financially unable 
to pay for utilities 
Borrowed money 
for basic needs 
Reduced food 
consumption 
Child ate less than 
3 times a day 
Any household 
member been sick 
Reduced healthcare 
expenditure 
         
Migrants X APR2020 -0.0317 0.0416* -0.00125 -0.00711 0.00908 -0.0816** -0.0224 -0.0139 
 (0.0250) (0.0212) (0.0327) (0.0333) (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0371) (0.0738) 
Migrants X MAY2020 0.00112 0.00624 -0.0650* -0.00768 0.00433 -0.0904** -0.0293 -0.0191 
 (0.0221) (0.0176) (0.0333) (0.0347) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0378) (0.0695) 
Migrants X JUN2020 -0.0309 0.0103 -0.0819** -0.0431 0.0187 -0.0186 -0.0254 -0.0702 
 (0.0197) (0.0163) (0.0365) (0.0358) (0.0380) (0.0401) (0.0354) (0.0803) 
Migrants X JUL2020 0.00108 -0.0114    -0.0689* -0.0817** -0.0440 
 (0.0206) (0.0168)    (0.0383) (0.0351) (0.0786) 
Migrants X AUG2020 -0.00176 -0.0192    -0.0587 -0.0540 0.0138 
 (0.0224) (0.0187)    (0.0377) (0.0365) (0.0706) 
Migrants X SEP2020 -0.00959 -0.0225 -0.0419 -0.00524 0.0535 0.0168 -0.0531 -0.0294 
 (0.0210) (0.0169) (0.0306) (0.0284) (0.0335) (0.0366) (0.0349) (0.0743) 
Migrants X OCT2020 -0.0329* -0.0145 -0.0682** -0.0634** 0.00119 0.00484 -0.0777** 0.0115 
 (0.0192) (0.0136) (0.0295) (0.0316) (0.0343) (0.0383) (0.0343) (0.0953) 
Migrants X NOV2020 -0.00186 -0.0221 -0.0130 -0.0140 0.00819 0.00452 -0.0796** -0.0755 
 (0.0177) (0.0143) (0.0308) (0.0317) (0.0355) (0.0373) (0.0365) (0.0846) 
APR2020 -0.0532** 0.0330* 0.0596** 0.0572** 0.116*** 0.102*** 0.00424 -0.0395 
 (0.0209) (0.0174) (0.0283) (0.0282) (0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0324) (0.0664) 
MAY2020 -0.0495** 0.0310* 0.119*** 0.0864*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.0211 0.0277 
 (0.0203) (0.0160) (0.0292) (0.0274) (0.0307) (0.0318) (0.0339) (0.0566) 
JUN2020 -0.0196 0.0107 0.200*** 0.113*** 0.128*** 0.0982*** -0.0483 0.0319 
 (0.0182) (0.0151) (0.0316) (0.0302) (0.0312) (0.0324) (0.0296) (0.0682) 
JUL2020 -0.0798*** 0.0443***    0.0797*** -0.0228 -0.00488 
 (0.0192) (0.0166)    (0.0308) (0.0317) (0.0715) 
AUG2020 -0.0739*** 0.0577***    0.0634** 0.00589 0.0313 
 (0.0198) (0.0175)    (0.0308) (0.0323) (0.0594) 
SEP2020 -0.0525*** 0.0448*** 0.112*** 0.00837 -0.00488 0.0162 0.0243 0.0229 
 (0.0192) (0.0167) (0.0270) (0.0242) (0.0272) (0.0292) (0.0295) (0.0604) 
OCT2020 -0.0364** 0.0515*** 0.0925*** 0.0654** 0.0478* 0.0418 0.0172 0.00469 
 (0.0180) (0.0145) (0.0274) (0.0281) (0.0275) (0.0297) (0.0306) (0.0792) 
NOV2020 -0.0357** 0.0199 0.0386 0.0376 0.0146 -0.00984 -0.0207 0.122* 
 (0.0164) (0.0133) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0284) (0.0287) (0.0319) (0.0632) 
         
Observations 30,664 25,699 29,502 29,502 29,502 25,699 30,664 12,922 
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Other explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, Migration Status, 
electricity outage, and water disruption. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator to subtract household-level means of 
variables from each observation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4: Impact of migration on household welfare during the with-COVID-19 period (sub-sample, continued) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Perception of financial and economic situation of household and living area 
VARIABLES Current financial 
condition is worse than 
before 
Expecting financial 
condition gets worse 
Perceives own 
household as poor 
 Own life perceived 




Perceives area’s job situation as 
bad 
       
Migrants X APR2020 -0.00362 0.00369 -0.0934*** -0.00676 -0.00705 -0.0820** 
 (0.0287) (0.0231) (0.0357) (0.0179) (0.0288) (0.0383) 
Migrants X MAY2020 -0.0221 0.0135 -0.0509 -0.000892 -0.0258 -0.108*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0237) (0.0348) (0.0207) (0.0308) (0.0390) 
Migrants X JUN2020 -0.0494 0.00388 -0.0820** 0.0224 -0.0503 -0.0659* 
 (0.0302) (0.0157) (0.0351) (0.0165) (0.0308) (0.0391) 
Migrants X JUL2020 -0.0404 -0.0231 -0.0547 -0.0255 -0.0640** -0.0758* 
 (0.0302) (0.0217) (0.0340) (0.0188) (0.0291) (0.0390) 
Migrants X AUG2020 -0.0539** -0.0129 -0.100*** -0.00142 -0.0202 -0.0942** 
 (0.0254) (0.0172) (0.0346) (0.0192) (0.0264) (0.0372) 
Migrants X SEP2020 -0.00521 0.0135 -0.127*** 0.0236 -0.0604** -0.0947** 
 (0.0214) (0.0123) (0.0368) (0.0154) (0.0251) (0.0417) 
Migrants X OCT2020 -0.0264 0.0116 -0.0863** -0.0275 -0.0544* -0.0109 
 (0.0237) (0.0157) (0.0363) (0.0196) (0.0291) (0.0401) 
Migrants X NOV2020 0.0696** 0.0239 -0.112*** 0.0361** -0.0169 -0.126*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0193) (0.0368) (0.0171) (0.0341) (0.0399) 
APR2020 0.102*** 0.0670*** 0.0679** 0.00139 0.00937 0.0814** 
 (0.0246) (0.0193) (0.0310) (0.0161) (0.0262) (0.0326) 
MAY2020 0.167*** 0.0431** 0.0886*** 0.0254 0.111*** 0.238*** 
 (0.0278) (0.0199) (0.0294) (0.0185) (0.0260) (0.0327) 
JUN2020 0.127*** -0.0141 0.0470 -0.0192 0.0880*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0141) (0.0305) (0.0148) (0.0260) (0.0321) 
JUL2020 0.165*** 0.0526*** -0.0104 0.00963 0.0919*** 0.247*** 
 (0.0260) (0.0199) (0.0298) (0.0186) (0.0264) (0.0331) 
AUG2020 0.154*** 0.0671*** 0.00454 -0.00157 0.0431** 0.252*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0161) (0.0302) (0.0172) (0.0218) (0.0315) 
SEP2020 0.107*** 0.0436*** 0.0360 -0.0113 0.0366 0.166*** 
 (0.0182) (0.0112) (0.0299) (0.0137) (0.0243) (0.0351) 
OCT2020 0.129*** 0.0554*** 0.0198 0.0319* 0.130*** 0.0991*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0135) (0.0306) (0.0192) (0.0250) (0.0339) 
NOV2020 0.123*** 0.0579*** 0.0168 -0.0260* 0.107*** 0.0482 
 (0.0214) (0.0150) (0.0303) (0.0153) (0.0261) (0.0313) 
       
Observations 30,664 30,664 28,306 28,306 28,306 28,306 
       
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Other explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, migration status, 
electricity outage, and water disruption. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator to subtract household-level means of 
variables from each observation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 5: Impact of remittances on household welfare during the with-COVID-19 period (sub-sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Food Security Finance for Basic Needs Consumption Healthcare 
VARIABLES Able to buy 
enough food 
Not able to buy 
enough food for 
children 
Financially 
unable to pay 
for utilities 
Borrowed 




Child ate less 








         
Monthly remittance X APR2020 -0.0394 0.0372 -0.0733** -0.0562* 0.104*** -0.0713* -0.0311 -0.158** 
 (0.0277) (0.0253) (0.0339) (0.0337) (0.0399) (0.0372) (0.0388) (0.0653) 
Monthly remittance X MAY2020 0.00112 -0.00467 -0.133*** -0.0716** -0.0113 -0.103*** -0.0793** -0.0991 
 (0.0221) (0.0189) (0.0323) (0.0344) (0.0374) (0.0362) (0.0383) (0.0695) 
Monthly remittance X JUN2020 -0.0223 0.00345 -0.132*** -0.128*** -0.00630 -0.0499 -0.0320 -0.159** 
 (0.0199) (0.0167) (0.0350) (0.0337) (0.0372) (0.0388) (0.0354) (0.0746) 
Monthly remittance X JUL2020 -0.0124 0.000267    -0.143*** -0.0771** -0.0575 
 (0.0195) (0.0161)    (0.0368) (0.0347) (0.0743) 
Monthly remittance X AUG2020 0.00950 -0.0230    -0.104*** -0.0773** -0.111* 
 (0.0221) (0.0184)    (0.0368) (0.0360) (0.0677) 
Monthly remittance X SEP2020 -0.00173 -0.0277* -0.0381 -0.00642 0.0465 0.00311 -0.0598* -0.0787 
 (0.0207) (0.0168) (0.0301) (0.0279) (0.0334) (0.0362) (0.0344) (0.0734) 
Monthly remittance X OCT2020 -0.0362* -0.0118 -0.0718** -0.0481 0.0183 -0.0213 -0.0943*** -0.0243 
 (0.0190) (0.0133) (0.0291) (0.0311) (0.0338) (0.0380) (0.0340) (0.0928) 
Monthly remittance X NOV2020 -0.0123 -0.0155 -0.0232 -0.0283 0.0140 0.0162 -0.0626* -0.0168 
 (0.0175) (0.0141) (0.0305) (0.0314) (0.0351) (0.0370) (0.0362) (0.0851) 
APR2020 -0.0542*** 0.0459*** 0.0892*** 0.0754*** 0.0842*** 0.0681** 0.0179 0.0128 
 (0.0175) (0.0151) (0.0243) (0.0234) (0.0259) (0.0271) (0.0266) (0.0513) 
MAY2020 -0.0457*** 0.0364** 0.137*** 0.113*** 0.152*** 0.129*** 0.0465 0.0552 
 (0.0177) (0.0146) (0.0254) (0.0236) (0.0261) (0.0268) (0.0304) (0.0467) 
JUN2020 -0.0255 0.0150 0.213*** 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.107*** -0.0432 0.0663 
 (0.0175) (0.0151) (0.0280) (0.0270) (0.0287) (0.0296) (0.0277) (0.0619) 
JUL2020 -0.0720*** 0.0372**    0.113*** -0.0301 -0.00146 
 (0.0178) (0.0157)    (0.0290) (0.0308) (0.0667) 
AUG2020 -0.0794*** 0.0589***    0.0852*** 0.0175 0.0993* 
 (0.0204) (0.0177)    (0.0297) (0.0317) (0.0560) 
SEP2020 -0.0567*** 0.0474*** 0.109*** 0.00842 -0.000685 0.0235 0.0270 0.0481 
 (0.0195) (0.0171) (0.0267) (0.0239) (0.0271) (0.0287) (0.0292) (0.0588) 
OCT2020 -0.0351** 0.0496*** 0.0922*** 0.0554** 0.0385 0.0546* 0.0247 0.0223 
 (0.0176) (0.0142) (0.0270) (0.0275) (0.0270) (0.0293) (0.0303) (0.0750) 
NOV2020 -0.0300* 0.0159 0.0428 0.0441* 0.0116 -0.0162 -0.0316 0.0890 
 (0.0165) (0.0134) (0.0262) (0.0263) (0.0280) (0.0285) (0.0317) (0.0638) 
         
Observations 30,664 25,699 29,502 29,502 29,502 25,699 30,664 12,922 
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Other explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, migration status, electricity outage, 
and water disruption. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator to subtract household-level means of variables from each observation. This table 
reports the sub-sample analyses only with households that sent migrants in 2019.. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5: Impact of Remittance during COVID on Households’ Economic Well-being (sub-sample, continued) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 Perception of financial and economic situation of household and living area 
VARIABLES Current financial 
condition is worse 
than before 
Expecting financial 




Own life perceived 
as unsatisfactory 
Perceives area’s 
economic condition as 
bad 
Perceives area’s job 
situation as bad 
       
Monthly remittance X APR2020 -0.0157 0.0397 -0.129*** 0.00342 -0.0151 -0.153*** 
 (0.0286) (0.0250) (0.0353) (0.0170) (0.0284) (0.0390) 
Monthly remittance X MAY2020 -0.101*** 0.0276 -0.125*** -0.0233 -0.105*** -0.211*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0242) (0.0347) (0.0191) (0.0291) (0.0382) 
Monthly remittance X JUN2020 -0.102*** 0.0106 -0.0982*** 0.0119 -0.136*** -0.210*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0155) (0.0341) (0.0161) (0.0282) (0.0384) 
Monthly remittance X JUL2020 -0.0738** -0.0579*** -0.0562* -0.0216 -0.0985*** -0.114*** 
 (0.0292) (0.0208) (0.0331) (0.0178) (0.0276) (0.0378) 
Monthly remittance X AUG2020 -0.0733*** -0.00338 -0.116*** -0.00679 -0.0537** -0.101*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0167) (0.0338) (0.0190) (0.0261) (0.0366) 
Monthly remittance X SEP2020 -0.00301 0.0143 -0.128*** 0.0280* -0.0629** -0.102** 
 (0.0215) (0.0125) (0.0363) (0.0153) (0.0250) (0.0412) 
Monthly remittance X OCT2020 -0.0173 0.0198 -0.0938*** -0.0288 -0.0825*** -0.0389 
 (0.0234) (0.0155) (0.0358) (0.0190) (0.0285) (0.0393) 
Monthly remittance X NOV2020 0.0427 0.0347* -0.119*** 0.0290* -0.0524 -0.154*** 
 (0.0287) (0.0193) (0.0363) (0.0170) (0.0337) (0.0394) 
APR2020 0.100*** 0.0525*** 0.0601** -0.00729 0.00986 0.0955*** 
 (0.0199) (0.0144) (0.0254) (0.0135) (0.0208) (0.0258) 
MAY2020 0.190*** 0.0378** 0.112*** 0.0319* 0.137*** 0.265*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0167) (0.0254) (0.0168) (0.0236) (0.0269) 
JUN2020 0.141*** -0.0184 0.0446* -0.0130 0.120*** 0.248*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0124) (0.0267) (0.0134) (0.0248) (0.0276) 
JUL2020 0.179*** 0.0689*** -0.0136 0.00543 0.106*** 0.263*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0198) (0.0279) (0.0173) (0.0259) (0.0300) 
AUG2020 0.162*** 0.0606*** 0.00866 0.000802 0.0603*** 0.253*** 
 (0.0233) (0.0154) (0.0286) (0.0170) (0.0217) (0.0297) 
SEP2020 0.105*** 0.0429*** 0.0346 -0.0137 0.0368 0.168*** 
 (0.0183) (0.0117) (0.0293) (0.0136) (0.0243) (0.0344) 
OCT2020 0.122*** 0.0509*** 0.0211 0.0314* 0.142*** 0.114*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0130) (0.0294) (0.0186) (0.0246) (0.0324) 
NOV2020 0.138*** 0.0525*** 0.0170 -0.0217 0.125*** 0.0587* 
 (0.0221) (0.0144) (0.0292) (0.0154) (0.0256) (0.0302) 
       
Observations 30,664 30,664 28,306 28,306 28,306 28,306 
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Other explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, Migration Status, electricity outage, and water disruption. 
Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator, with household-level means of dependent and independent variables are subtracted from each observation. This table reports 
the sub-sample analyses only with households that sent migrants in 2019. Full sample results are available upon request. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6: Impact of migration/remittances on household welfare throughout the with-COVID-19 period 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Food Security Finance for Basic Needs Consumption Healthcare 
VARIABLES Able to buy 
enough food 
Not able to buy 
enough food for 
children 
Financially unable to 






Child ate less 
than 3 times 
a day 
Any household 




         
I. Full Sample Analysis 
 
I.A: Migration  
     
(A) Migrants X COVID 8.06e-05 -0.00961 -0.0403*** -0.0275** -0.0119 -0.00429 -0.0454*** -0.0321 
 (0.00945) (0.00720) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0175) (0.0158) (0.0140) (0.0263) 
I.B: Remittance       
(B) Remittance X COVID -0.00307 -0.0109 -0.0713*** -0.0563*** -0.00889 -0.0318** -0.0551*** -0.0732*** 
 (0.00954) (0.00736) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0182) (0.0150) (0.0142) (0.0248) 
         
Observations 70,598 55,256 68,195 68,195 68,195 55,256 70,598 30,272 
         




(A) Migrants X COVID -0.0126 -0.00408 -0.0433** -0.0212 0.0198 -0.0370* -0.0509*** -0.0303 
 (0.0125) (0.00916) (0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0236) (0.0215) (0.0188) (0.0370) 
II.B: Remittance         
(B) Remittance X COVID -0.0135 -0.00696 -0.0793*** -0.0615*** 0.0129 -0.0626*** -0.0660*** -0.0856** 
 (0.0116) (0.00886) (0.0173) (0.0177) (0.0223) (0.0192) (0.0180) (0.0337) 
         
Observations 30,664 25,699 29,502 29,502 29,502 25,699 30,664 12,922 
         
III. Estimation with Instrumental Variables     
     
III.A: Migration         
(A) Migrants X COVID 0.0450 -0.0868 -0.0878 -0.0709 -0.158** 0.118 -0.213** 0.0545 
 (0.0389) (0.0543) (0.0609) (0.0514) (0.0696) (0.0970) (0.103) (0.0811) 
III.B: Remittance         
(B) Remittance X COVID 0.0670 -0.122** -0.173* -0.115 -0.246** 0.169* -0.324*** 0.0612 
 (0.0531) (0.0497) (0.0926) (0.0837) (0.103) (0.0870) (0.114) (0.113) 
         
Observations 43,341 39,216 41,268 41,268 41,268 39,216 43,341 16,412 
         
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Only the coefficients on the interaction terms of Migration/Remittance and the After-COVID dummy are reported. Other 
explanatory variables are After COVID dummy, Migration/Remittance status, year dummy, month dummy, disruptions in electricity, and disruptions in water supply. Tables of full 
results are available upon request. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator to subtract household-level means of variables from each 
observation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 6: Impact of migration/remittances on household welfare throughout the with-COVID-19 period (continued) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES Current financial 
condition is worse 
than before 
Expecting financial 
condition gets worse 
Perceives own household 
as poor 
Own life perceived as 
unsatisfactory 
Perceives area’s 




situation as bad 
       
I. Full Sample Analysis 
I.A: Migration  
   
(A) Migrants X COVID -0.0278*** -0.00774 -0.0408*** -0.00396 -0.0279** -0.0306* 
 (0.00999) (0.00655) (0.0144) (0.00689) (0.0123) (0.0162) 
I.B: Remittance    
(B) Remittance X COVID -0.0396*** 0.00179 -0.0670*** -0.00639 -0.0574*** -0.0712*** 
 (0.00956) (0.00647) (0.0143) (0.00670) (0.0113) (0.0157) 
       
Observations 70,598 55,256 62,772 62,772 62,772 62,772 
       
II. Sub-Sample Analysis (Only with HHs sending migrants in 2019) 
II.A: Migration 
    
(A) Migrants X COVID -0.0194 0.00238 -0.0861*** 0.00260 -0.0382** -0.0736*** 
 (0.0145) (0.00883) (0.0191) (0.00893) (0.0168) (0.0219) 
II.B: Remittance       
(B) Remittance X COVID -0.0444*** 0.00878 -0.113*** -0.00190 -0.0744*** -0.124*** 
 (0.0131) (0.00848) (0.0175) (0.00814) (0.0147) (0.0197) 
       
Observations 29,502 29,502 28,306 25,699 28,306 28,306 
       
III. Estimation with Instrumental Variables  
III.A: Migration       
(A) Migrants X COVID -0.0418 -0.0506* 0.130* -0.00535 -0.00892 0.0238 
 (0.0339) (0.0277) (0.0785) (0.0276) (0.0406) (0.0520) 
III.B: Remittance       
(B) Remittance X COVID -0.0562 -0.0618* 0.180** -0.00213 -0.0130 0.0322 
 (0.0473) (0.0361) (0.0869) (0.0411) (0.0562) (0.0740) 
       
Observations 43,341 43,341 43,341 43,341 43,341 43,341 
       
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. Only the coefficients on the interaction terms of Migration/Remittance and the After-COVID dummy are reported. Other 
explanatory variables are After COVID dummy, Migration/Remittance status, year dummy, month dummy, disruptions in electricity, and disruptions in water supply. Tables of full 
results are available upon request. Household-level fixed effect estimation are implemented by a within-estimator to subtract household-level means of variables from each 
observation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 45 
Appendix Figure 1: Food security measures under the pandemic 
 
(1)  Worried about enough food to eat    (2)  Unable to eat healthy/nutritious food 
 
(3) Only a few kinds of food           (4)  Skip a meal 
 






(7)  Hungry                          (8) Went without eating for a whole day 
 
Source: Authors 
Note: The questions are (1) Are you worried about being unable to have enough food to eat because of a 
lack of money or other resources? (2) Are you unable to eat healthy and nutritious food because of a 
lack of money or other resources? (3) Did you eat only a few kinds of food because of a lack of money 
or other resources? (4) Did you have to skip a meal because of a lack of money or other resources to get 
food? (5) Did you eat less than you thought you should because of a lack of money or other resource? 
(6) Did you run out of food because of a lack of money or other resources? (7) Were you hungry but did 
not eat because there was not enough money or resources for food? And (8) Did you go without eating 





Appendix Table A1: Impact of Migration during COVID on Food Security Measures (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Worried about 
enough food 
Unable to eat 
healthy/nutritious 
food 
Ate only a few 
kinds of food 
Skip a meal Ate less Ran out of food Hungry Without eating for 
a whole day 
         
Migrants X APR2020 -0.0151 0.00857 0.0197 0.0244 0.000253 0.00910 4.94e-05 0.0214* 
 (0.0263) (0.0257) (0.0261) (0.0241) (0.0232) (0.0191) (0.0133) (0.0121) 
Migrants X MAY2020 -0.0337 -0.0233 -0.0367 -0.0122 -0.0240 -0.0307* -0.000957 0.00891 
 (0.0258) (0.0250) (0.0254) (0.0233) (0.0224) (0.0180) (0.0139) (0.0124) 
Migrants X JUN2020 -0.00570 0.00578 -0.0225 0.00961 -0.0264 0.00702 0.00527 0.0155 
 (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0262) (0.0236) (0.0224) (0.0165) (0.0122) (0.0109) 
Migrants X JUL2020 -0.0411 -0.0269 -0.0310 -0.00800 -0.0231 -0.00949 -0.00313 0.00590 
 (0.0260) (0.0261) (0.0259) (0.0213) (0.0201) (0.0149) (0.0107) (0.00862) 
Migrants X AUG2020 -0.0111 0.00995 -0.0215 0.0209 -0.0284 -0.0308* -0.0121 -0.00361 
 (0.0270) (0.0261) (0.0258) (0.0229) (0.0212) (0.0167) (0.0117) (0.00954) 
Migrants X SEP2020 -0.0594** -0.0132 -0.0279 -0.0200 -0.0392* -0.0144 -0.0102 -0.00155 
 (0.0266) (0.0257) (0.0252) (0.0217) (0.0212) (0.0172) (0.0107) (0.00922) 
Migrants X OCT2020 -0.0567** -0.0272 -0.0585** -0.00212 -0.0192 -0.00978 0.0140 0.00571 
 (0.0261) (0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0230) (0.0218) (0.0171) (0.0133) (0.0107) 
Migrants X NOV2020 -0.0486* -0.0377 -0.0637** -0.00942 -0.0259 -0.00943 -0.0153 -0.00196 
 (0.0257) (0.0259) (0.0256) (0.0230) (0.0225) (0.0166) (0.0129) (0.0112) 
APR2020 0.0920*** 0.0750*** 0.0604*** 0.0438*** 0.0640*** 0.0465*** 0.0384*** 0.0257*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0165) (0.0159) (0.0126) (0.0104) (0.00906) 
MAY2020 0.0607*** 0.0655*** 0.0560*** 0.0527*** 0.0847*** 0.0391*** 0.0302*** 0.0178* 
 (0.0174) (0.0165) (0.0175) (0.0158) (0.0160) (0.0139) (0.0108) (0.00989) 
JUN2020 -0.0225 0.0164 -0.0169 0.00876 0.0204 -0.00904 0.0148 0.0159* 
 (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0162) (0.0156) (0.0131) (0.00961) (0.00902) 
JUL2020 0.0294* 0.0282* -0.0208 -0.0359** -0.0454*** 6.34e-05 0.0334*** 0.0397*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0167) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0123) (0.00970) (0.00862) 
AUG2020 -0.0891*** -0.0495*** -0.0862*** -0.0443*** -0.0462*** -0.0104 0.0356*** 0.0251*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0167) (0.0177) (0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0126) (0.00977) (0.00877) 
SEP2020 -0.0546*** -0.0299* -0.0764*** -0.0390*** -0.0205 -0.0177 0.0271*** 0.0207*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0160) (0.0165) (0.0150) (0.0144) (0.0123) (0.00889) (0.00797) 
OCT2020 -0.0355** 0.000351 -0.0321* -0.0324** 0.000414 -0.00125 0.0306*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0171) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0113) (0.00913) (0.00862) 
NOV2020 -0.0437*** -0.0412** -0.0580*** -0.0376** -0.0395*** -0.0274** 0.0353*** 0.0315*** 
 (0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0118) (0.00966) (0.00867) 
         
Observations 49,862 49,862 49,862 49,080 49,862 49,862 49,080 49,080 
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. The explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, migration status, electricity outage, and water disruption. 




Appendix Table A2: Impact of Remittance during COVID on Food Security Measures (Full Sample) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Worried about 
enough food 
Unable to eat 
healthy/nutritio
us food 
Ate only a few 
kinds of food 
Skip a meal Ate less Ran out of food Hungry Without eating 
for a whole day 
         
Monthly remittance X APR2020 -0.0597** -0.0459 -0.0159 -0.0988*** -0.0971*** 0.0551** 0.00209 0.0214 
 (0.0299) (0.0296) (0.0304) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0264) (0.0163) (0.0153) 
Monthly remittance X MAY2020 -0.118*** -0.0939*** -0.101*** -0.109*** -0.109*** -0.00344 0.00158 0.0138 
 (0.0287) (0.0278) (0.0282) (0.0235) (0.0228) (0.0214) (0.0160) (0.0143) 
Monthly remittance X JUN2020 -0.0705** -0.0221 -0.0470* -0.0557** -0.0753*** 0.0172 0.00737 0.0207* 
 (0.0280) (0.0281) (0.0274) (0.0238) (0.0220) (0.0185) (0.0135) (0.0125) 
Monthly remittance X JUL2020 -0.0804*** -0.0461* -0.0493* -0.0455** -0.0509*** -0.00450 0.000712 0.0112 
 (0.0263) (0.0263) (0.0262) (0.0205) (0.0193) (0.0155) (0.0110) (0.00876) 
Monthly remittance X AUG2020 -0.0270 -0.00302 -0.0350 0.00247 -0.0457** -0.0362** -0.0133 -0.00513 
 (0.0272) (0.0262) (0.0259) (0.0228) (0.0207) (0.0167) (0.0113) (0.00895) 
Monthly remittance X SEP2020 -0.0631** -0.00939 -0.0228 -0.0216 -0.0363* -0.0158 -0.0123 -0.00341 
 (0.0264) (0.0256) (0.0251) (0.0215) (0.0209) (0.0171) (0.0104) (0.00883) 
Monthly remittance X OCT2020 -0.0595** -0.0247 -0.0543** -0.00662 -0.0142 -0.00592 0.0187 0.00977 
 (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0258) (0.0228) (0.0217) (0.0175) (0.0136) (0.0109) 
Monthly remittance X NOV2020 -0.0584** -0.0402 -0.0651** -0.0176 -0.0299 -0.00507 -0.0104 0.00339 
 (0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0255) (0.0229) (0.0222) (0.0170) (0.0132) (0.0114) 
APR2020 0.101*** 0.0871*** 0.0711*** 0.0683*** 0.0815*** 0.0418*** 0.0393*** 0.0298*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0154) (0.0148) (0.0117) (0.00989) (0.00878) 
MAY2020 0.0772*** 0.0786*** 0.0664*** 0.0708*** 0.0998*** 0.0313** 0.0305*** 0.0184* 
 (0.0165) (0.0159) (0.0166) (0.0150) (0.0151) (0.0129) (0.0103) (0.00949) 
JUN2020 -0.00644 0.0232 -0.0131 0.0238 0.0291* -0.00996 0.0152 0.0161* 
 (0.0173) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0157) (0.0151) (0.0126) (0.00937) (0.00880) 
JUL2020 0.0389** 0.0320* -0.0175 -0.0267* -0.0395*** -0.00130 0.0323*** 0.0384*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0168) (0.0165) (0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0120) (0.00949) (0.00849) 
AUG2020 -0.0850*** -0.0461*** -0.0833*** -0.0393*** -0.0427*** -0.00926 0.0358*** 0.0254*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0165) (0.0175) (0.0151) (0.0149) (0.0125) (0.00971) (0.00877) 
SEP2020 -0.0544*** -0.0317** -0.0786*** -0.0393*** -0.0224 -0.0173 0.0276*** 0.0213*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0159) (0.0164) (0.0149) (0.0143) (0.0122) (0.00889) (0.00800) 
OCT2020 -0.0355** -0.000880 -0.0343** -0.0315** -0.00157 -0.00234 0.0295*** 0.0305*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0112) (0.00902) (0.00854) 
NOV2020 -0.0421** -0.0416** -0.0591*** -0.0361** -0.0395*** -0.0287** 0.0338*** 0.0300*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0116) (0.00955) (0.00861) 
         
Observations 49,862 49,862 49,862 49,080 49,862 49,862 49,080 49,080 
Source: Authors  
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the level of household. The explanatory variables not shown in this table are year dummy, month dummy, migration status, electricity outage, and water disruption.  
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